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INTO THE BRIAR PATCH?: POWER SHIFTS
BETWEEN PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE
AFTER UNITED STATES V. BOOKER
Margareth Etienne∗
I. INTRODUCTION
In the popular series of Uncle Remus fairytales by Joel Chandler Harris,1
Brer Fox is constantly trying to figure out a way to get back at his nemesis,
the uppity Brer Rabbit. In The Wonderful Tar-Baby story, Brer Fox mixes tar
and turpentine and creates a figure that he calls Tar-Baby. Brer Fox puts a
large straw hat on Tar-Baby’s head and places her by the side of the road
while he hides in the bushes and waits for Brer Rabbit to come along. Soon
enough, Brer Rabbit comes sashaying down the road, in his usual “lippityclippity, clippity-lippity” way. He stops and greets Tar-Baby, who doesn’t
say a word. Brer Rabbit, not used to being ignored, tries to charm Tar-Baby
into talking and grows increasingly frustrated as she remains silent. Finally,
Brer Rabbit hits and kicks at Tar-Baby until he is stuck in the ball of tar.
Brer Fox, who has been watching everything from his hiding place,
suddenly appears and is delighted that he has finally succeeded in catching
Brer Rabbit.
As a triumphant Brer Fox wonders aloud whether he should kill Brer
Rabbit by barbequing, drowning, hanging him or worse, Brer Rabbit begs
and begs his captor to do whatever he wants with him so long as he does
not “fling [him] in dat briar-patch.”2 Brer Fox, wanting Brer Rabbit to die
the most miserable death apparently imaginable to rabbits, throws him
right into the middle of the briar patch. Moments later, Brer Fox watches as
Brer Rabbit skips away gleefully, combing the tar out of his hair with the
twigs and chips from the briar patch. Brer Rabbit could be heard hollering
triumphantly that he had been born and bred in the briar patch. Brer Fox
had been tricked again, and the ongoing battle between Brers Fox and
Rabbit is left to another day.3

∗
Associate Professor and Richard W. and Marie L. Corman Fellow, University of Illinois
College of Law. I would like to thank Patrick J. Keenan for his tremendously helpful
comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I am also very grateful to Amy Tomaszewski for
her efficient and valuable research assistance.
1
JOEL CHANDLER HARRIS, THE FAVORITE UNCLE REMUS (1948).
2
Id. at 53.
3
The first part of this wonderful Southern fable begins in The Wonderful Tar-Baby story, and
continues in The Briar Patch story. Id. at 47-50, 51-54.

741

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2005

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 39, No. 3 [2005], Art. 5

742

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

The Tar-Baby story is instructive in understanding the latest
developments in the regulation of federal sentencing. The Supreme Court,
in United States v. Booker,4 threw federal prosecutors into the briar patch of
much maligned indiscriminate sentencing. The Department of Justice can
already be heard complaining about the Court’s decision to make the
Guidelines advisory rather than mandatory. But prosecutors narrowly
escaped a situation that could have proved much more difficult for the
Government when the Court decided not to engraft the Sixth Amendment
jury-trial requirement onto the Sentencing Reform Act.5 Although only
time will reveal the true winners and losers of the Booker decision, there is
good reason to believe that the prosecution has won this round and that
criminal defendants will have to seek favorable sentencing changes
elsewhere.
In this Article, I consider the Court’s characterization of the
constitutional problem in federal sentencing and examine its chosen remedy
in assessing the potential ramifications for the Government and the defense.
I argue that the solution carved out by the Booker Court was the best
solution the Government could have hoped for following Blakely v.
Washington6 and its predecessors. First, I note that the Court did not
explicitly require that the reasonable doubt standard be used at sentencing
and discuss the implications of this omission. This arguably eliminates one
of the principal procedural safeguards sought by the defense. For many
defendants, this will permit “the sentencing factor tail” to continue
“wagging the conviction dog.”7 Second, I contend that judges will continue
applying the guidelines even though they are now advisory. Although the
Booker decision is only a few months old, the preliminary evidence supports
this prediction. Indeed, in many instances, judges will be free to give higher
sentences than those previously available under the guidelines. Third,
defendants who want to challenge their advisory sentences will be subject
to a vague and watered-down “reasonableness” standard on appeal rather
than being entitled to the prior de novo review by appellate courts. No
doubt, government prosecutors did not seek a dismantling of the
125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
In fact, the Booker Court correctly notes that, in the final analysis, its chosen remedy is
remarkably similar to that urged by the Government. See id. at 758-59, 768.
6
124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
7
See infra Part II. This interesting phrase was first adopted in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477
U.S. 79 (1986), when the Court alluded to the potential constitutional problems inherent in
certain sentencing practices. A version of the phrase was again repeated by Justice Stevens,
writing for the Court in Apprendi, who declared that “[w]hen a judge’s finding based on a mere
preponderance of the evidence authorizes an increase in the maximum punishment, it is
appropriately characterized as ‘a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense.’”
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 495 (2000).
4
5
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mandatory guideline system any more than Brer Rabbit sought to be
entangled in tar. But once prosecutors found themselves in this
predicament, an advisory guideline scheme was a “briar-patch” solution by
the Supreme Court.
II. THE BOOKER DECISION: THE SIXTH AMENDMENT PROBLEM AND ITS
REMEDY
The only thing predictable about the Supreme Court’s recent holding
and remedy in United States v. Booker has been the reaction to it: Prosecutors
are disappointed.8 Defendants and their lawyers are overly optimistic.9
Federal judges are (mostly) jubilant.10 Congress is angry on one side of the
aisle and cautiously hopeful on the other.11 Many see in the decision the
end of federal criminal sentencing as we know it. Most of the stakeholders
Carl Huse & Adam Liptak, New Fight over Controlling Punishments Is Widely Seen, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 13, 2005, at A29 (reporting that Assistant Attorney General Christopher Wray,
speaking for the Justice Department, lamented: “We are disappointed that the decision made
the guidelines advisory in nature.”).
9
See Mark Hamblett, Defense Lawyers Hail Sentencing Decisions, 231 N.Y.L.J. 1 (describing
the defense as “ecstatic” about the Booker decision); Lorraine Woellert & Mike France, Corporate
Cases: Time to Cut a Deal?: A New Ruling Could Empower Defendants—Until Congress Rewrites
Sentencing Rules, BUS. WK., Jan. 24, 2005, at 43 (explaining that the decision “warmed the hearts
of many criminal defense lawyers—and their clients”).
The optimism on the part of criminal defendants is understandable as the decision has
been widely (and incorrectly in some cases) portrayed as a victory for defendants even though
one of the named defendants is likely to be adversely affected by the decision. See, e.g., David
Stout, Supreme Court Rules Judges Are Not Bound by Sentencing Rules, NAT’L ASS’N CRIM. DEF.
LAW., available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/mediasources/20050112c (Jan. 12, 2005)
(although Fanfan’s sentence is likely to be increased on remand, this article notes that “[t]he
ruling was a victory for defendants, Freddie J. Booker and Ducan Fanfan, whose sentences will
now be reviewed and probably adjusted downward.”).
10
See Hulse & Liptak, supra note 8 (quoting U.S. District Judge Jack B. Weinstein as
exclaiming: “I’m really elated, and I think most judges will be, too”); Myron H. Thompson,
Sentencing and Sensibility, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2005, at A23 (an op-ed piece by U.S. District Judge
Myron Thompson comparing the pre-Booker federal guidelines to Draco’s laws in ancient
Athens that spawned the adjective “draconian.”).
11
Republican Senator Orrin G. Hatch was apparently disappointed but unsurprised by the
decision, while Florida Republican Tom Feeney characterized the decision as an “egregious
overreach.” Hulse & Liptak, supra note 8. In contrast, Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy took a
wait-and-see approach: “Congress should resist the urge to rush in with quick fixes that would
only generate more uncertainty and litigation and do nothing to protect public safety.” Tony
Mauro, Sentence Fragment: A Supreme Court Decision Last Week Turned Back the Clock 20 Years on
Sentencing. Now Judges Are in Control and Congress Is Watching, LEG. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2005, at 1.
Massachusetts Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D), stated that he was “confident that the vast
majority of federal judges will continue to apply the guidelines in ways that respect the basic
goals of fairness and consistency in sentencing criminal defendants.” United States v. Booker,
United States v. Fanfan and the Future of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Statement of Senator
Edward Kennedy, Senate Judiciary Committee (Jan. 12, 2005), at http://action.democratic
majority.com/victory2004/index.asp?test=true&ID=325 (last visited Apr. 17, 2005).
8
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in the federal criminal system are hurriedly attempting to sort out how the
new system will look and who will be the winners and losers under the new
regime.
In Booker, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed by a five to four
majority12 its previous holding that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial requires that any fact used to increase the sentence of a criminal
defendant beyond the maximum provided for in a mandatory guidelines
scheme must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt.13 The court further found that the federal sentencing
guidelines were no exception to this general rule.14 This application of the
Sixth Amendment jury trial right is of little surprise because it is the natural
culmination of a handful of cases, starting with Jones v. United States15 and
Apprendi v. New Jersey.16 Less than a year before the decision in Booker, the
Court reversed a defendant’s sentence in Blakely v. Washington17 because the
sentence had been enhanced beyond the guidelines maximum (but not the
statutory maximum) based on facts found at sentencing by the judge by a
preponderance of the evidence.18 Although Blakely concerned the
Washington State Sentencing Guidelines, the Supreme Court’s holding
understandably cast into grave doubt the constitutionality of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines.19
Thus, the Court’s finding in Booker that the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines suffered the same constitutional problem as the Washington
State Guidelines was hardly unexpected. What was more surprising than
the decision to continue with the Apprendi-line of cases was the Court’s
12
The Booker decision consists of two distinct majority opinions. Justice Stevens authored
the first majority opinion addressing the constitutionality of the federal guidelines. He was
joined by Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg. The second majority opinion,
outlining the remedy, was supported by a different majority of justices. The remedial opinion
was authored by Justice Breyer and joined by Justices Rehnquist, O’Connor, Kennedy and
Ginsburg.
13
United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 756 (2005).
14
Id. at 755 (explaining that “our holding in Blakely applies to the Sentencing Guidelines.”).
15
526 U.S. 227, 230 (1999).
16
530 U.S. 466 (2000). Although most practitioners and scholars became familiar with the
issue in Apprendi and consider it to be the inception of the line of cases leading to Booker, the
Court properly notes that the question first arose in Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 230
(1999). See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 752 (noting that the Sixth Amendment problem at issue in Booker
was “first considered in Jones and developed in Apprendi”).
17
124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004).
18
Id. at 2534.
19
O’Connor’s dissent in Blakely asserted that the decision would probably apply to the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 2549-50 (“The structure of the Federal Guidelines
likewise does not, as the Government half-heartedly suggests, provide any grounds for
distinction”). O’Connor made a similar point in Apprendi. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 549-554.
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chosen remedy for the Sixth Amendment infirmity. Rather than require
that juries henceforth be used to find all facts necessary to determine the
guideline range, a different five to four majority of the Court20 chose to
sever and excise the portions of the Sentencing Reforming Act that made
the guidelines mandatory.21 The justices who favored this remedy over the
jury-sentencing remedy argued that it was more faithful to the overriding
goals of Congress’s sentencing reform.22 Ironically, the end result is an
advisory guideline system that more closely resembles the indeterminate
sentencing scheme that preceded the promulgation of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines.
III. THE TAIL THAT WAGGED THE DOG BEFORE APPRENDI AND BLAKELY
Defendants appear to be the biggest losers under Booker. Of course,
they have the most to lose. The promise of applying the Sixth Amendment
jury trial requirement to sentencing enhancements was one of fairness.
Recognizing in the first part of the opinion that “jury factfinding may
impair the most expedient and efficient sentencing of defendants,” the
Court nonetheless maintains that “the interest in fairness and reliability
protected by the right to a jury trial—a common-law right that defendants
enjoyed for centuries and that is now enshrined in the Sixth Amendment—
has always outweighed the interest in concluding trials swiftly.”23 The
opportunity for greater fairness and reliability in sentencing was a
significant loss for defendants in the Booker decision.
The principal concern that Sixth Amendment jury factfinding was
expected to alleviate was that of the tail wagging the dog in sentencing. In
1986, in McMillan v. Pennsylvania,24 the Supreme Court alluded to what it
perceived to be an unacceptable (but inapplicable, in that case)
constitutional problem in criminal sentencing. Denyl McMillan faced a
mandatory minimum sentence of five years because after his jury trial and
conviction for aggravated assault, the sentencing judge additionally found
that he visibly possessed a firearm during the commission of the crime.
McMillan successfully argued at sentencing that Pennsylvania’s mandatory
minimum statute was unconstitutional because the evidence used to
enhance his sentence should be considered an element of the crime to be
20
See supra note 12. Notably, Justice Ginsburg is seemingly the only justice in agreement
with the entire decision, both on the constitutionality finding and its remedy.
21
Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 757 (contrasting the Court’s chosen remedy of rendering the
Guidelines advisory with the remedy proposed by the dissenters of engrafting a Sixth
Amendment “jury-trial” requirement onto the Guidelines).
22
Id. at 767.
23
Id. at 756.
24
477 U.S. 79 (1986).
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determined by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.25 The State appealed and
won before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. In affirming the state
appellate court, the United States Supreme Court recognized that states
may define certain factors elements of crimes or sentencing enhancements
(and prescribe burdens of proof accordingly) so long as the state did so
within certain constitutional limits.26 The Pennsylvania scheme was
determined to operate within constitutional bounds partly because it gave
“no impression of having been tailored to permit the [sentencing factor]
finding to be a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense.”27
Later in Apprendi and Blakely, the Court set aside the sentences largely
because of the questions of fairness invoked by the tail wagging the dog in
sentencing. In Apprendi, the defendant complained that the potential
doubling of his sentence from ten years to twenty years based on a judicial
finding at sentencing that his offense was a hate crime violated his due
process rights. Judge Stevens, writing for the Court, declared that “[w]hen
a judge’s finding based on a mere preponderance of the evidence authorizes
an increase in the maximum punishment, it is appropriately characterized
as ‘a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense.’”28
The Blakely Court relied more heavily on the Sixth Amendment than on
the due process clause in its assessment of the tail-wagging problem raised
by the defendant. Ralph Blakely entered into a plea agreement where he
pled guilty to second-degree kidnapping rather than first-degree
kidnapping. At sentencing, the court determined that he had acted with
deliberate cruelty.29 This sentencing factor effectively raised his sentence to
that which he would have received had he been convicted of the firstdegree kidnapping charge.30 The Supreme Court reversed Blakely’s
judicially-enhanced sentence, stating that reversal was needed to give full
effect to the Sixth Amendment right of jury trial.31 For the jury to act as a
check over the judiciary, according to the Supreme Court’s reasoning, the
judge must derive the power to sentence wholly from the jury’s verdict.

Id. at 82-83.
Id. at 86 (“Pennsylvania chose not to redefine those offenses in order to so include it, and
Patterson teaches that we should hesitate to conclude that due process bars the State from
pursuing its chosen course in the area of defining crimes and prescribing penalties.”) (citing
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977)).
27
Id. at 88.
28
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 495 (2000).
29
Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2534 (2004).
30
Id. at 2539.
31
Id. at 2538.
25
26
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Justice Scalia identified the crux of the dog-wagging problem that
Apprendi and Blakely sought to correct: the absence of oversight in a system
where the jury is “relegated to making a determination that the defendant
at some point did something wrong, a mere preliminary to a judicial
inquisition into the facts of the crime the State actually seeks to punish.”32
We now know in hindsight that Apprendi and Blakely represented the highwater marks for the aspiration that the jury trial safeguard might work to
inject some notion of fit between conviction and sentence. Any real hope of
resolving this problem in federal prosecutions in the near future died with
the remedy adopted in Booker.
IV. THE TAIL CONTINUES TO WAG THE DOG POST-BOOKER
Federal criminal defendants enjoyed their heyday, such as it was,
between Apprendi and Booker. In the period following Apprendi, prosecutors
regularly charged in their indictments all sentence-enhancing facts (such as
drug amounts) that could lead to an increase in the statutory maximum.
These facts provided notice to defendants of their full sentencing exposure
and had to be found by a jury at trial or admitted as part of a guilty plea. In
Blakely, the Court suggested that this practice ought to be applied to all facts
(other than the fact of a prior conviction) that could alter the “maximum
sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury
verdict or admitted by the defendant.”33
The sentencing system rejected in Blakely was essentially the system that
prevailed in federal criminal cases. The government needed only to possess
enough reliable, admissible evidence to convict the defendant of something;
once the conviction was obtained, the government could use virtually any
information it possessed to obtain the sentence it desired. After Blakely, the
assumption that this reasoning would soon be explicitly applied to the
federal system led many federal prosecutors to charge all sentencingenhancing facts or demand their admission at guilty pleas. Thus, during the
short post-Blakely, pre-Booker window, many defendants enjoyed a true
reprieve from the tail-wagging-dog phenomenon.
The reprieve ends with Booker because for all practical purposes, that
decision will continue to allow the tail to wag the dog. Once a defendant is
convicted of an underlying charge, the prosecution can seek to enhance her
sentence up to the statutory maximum (not just the now-advisory guideline
maximum) by presenting evidence that was neither found by the jury nor
admitted by the defendant in a guilty plea. This is so because the Booker
32
33

Id. at 2539 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 2537 (emphasis in original).
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Court reaffirmed the judge’s authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), to consider
a broad range of facts in imposing a sentence.34 Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),
these factors would likely include all of the grounds for enhancement that
were possible under the once-mandatory Guidelines, including relevant
and uncharged conduct—perhaps the most criticized dog-wagging basis for
enhancements.35
Anyone who doubts that defendants will continue to be sentenced on
the basis of conduct that was either uncharged, acquitted or unproven
beyond a reasonable doubt should consider the fate of Ducan Fanfan, the
defendant whose case was argued alongside Freddie Booker’s before the
Supreme Court.36 Fanfan was charged with and convicted of conspiracy to
distribute and to possess with intent to distribute at least five hundred
grams of cocaine.37 Based on the facts found by the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt, Fanfan faced a maximum guideline sentence of seventyeight months. At sentencing, the prosecution presented and the judge
found, by a preponderance of the evidence, additional facts authorizing a
sentence in the range of 188-235 months.38 Specifically, the court
determined that Fanfan was a leader or organizer of the criminal activity
and that he was responsible for relevant conduct that would bring his drug
quantities up to 2.5 kilograms of cocaine and over 261 grams of crack.39
Nonetheless, relying on Blakely’s Sixth Amendment reasoning, the judge
determined that he could not impose a sentence based on facts not found by
the jury.40
On appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the Fanfan case, authorizing
the Government to seek resentencing. The clear implication for Fanfan is
that the sentencing court may now consider the nature of Fanfan’s role and
the additional drugs not found by the jury in crafting Fanfan’s new
34
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000) (requiring the sentencing court to impose a sentence sufficient
but not greater than necessary to comply with legislatively determined purposes of
punishment). In addition to the characteristics of the offense and of the defendant, the
sentencing court must also weigh the need for deterrence, public safety, punishment, and
rehabilitative treatment. See id. § 3553 (a)(1)-(2).
35
See, e.g., Ian Weinstein, Fifteen Years after the Federal Sentencing Revolution: How Mandatory
Minimums Have Undermined Effective and Just Narcotics Sentencing, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 87
(2003); Erik Luna, Misguided Guidelines: A Critique of Federal Sentencing, 458 POL’Y ANALYSIS 1
(2002), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa458.pdf; Todd E. Witten, Comment,
Sentence Entrapment and Manipulation: Government Manipulation of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 29 AKRON L. REV. 697 (1996).
36
Fanfan v. United States, No. 03-47-P-H, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18593 (D. Me. June 28, 2004).
37
United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 747 (2005).
38
Id. at 741.
39
Id. at 747.
40
Id.
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sentence. Fanfan will likely not evoke much sympathy to the extent that he
appears to have benefited from a post-Blakely windfall. But whether Fanfan
got a windfall depends, of course, on whether he is actually responsible for
the additional drugs and actually organized or led the drug conspiracy.
There can be little doubt that a more reliable answer to that question would
result from a requirement at trial or sentencing that the Government prove
the contested facts beyond a reasonable doubt.
Nothing in the Booker remedy requires that the Government’s evidence
in Fanfan or in any other case be put to that test. Indeed, most courts that
have considered this question since Booker have found that defendants are
not entitled to jury determinations of sentencing facts or to a reasonable
doubt standard of proof.41 After Booker, the Government can continue to do
just what Justice Scalia condemned in Blakely: obtain a “back-door”
conviction for a more serious offense on which it had only scant (or
preponderance-level) evidence simply because it could obtain a conviction
for a less serious offense beyond a reasonable doubt.42 The Court’s
justification of this post-Booker result—that nothing in our history of
sentencing proscribes judges from considering a variety of factors in
sentencing43—rings hollow. The relevant question is not whether courts
have traditionally been afforded the discretion to consider a wide range of
sentencing factors, but whether there are some factors upon which the
Government may not rely absent a more reliable and exacting burden of
proof. Whatever one thinks is the appropriate sentence for Fanfan, it is
certain that the process by which it will now be derived will more closely
resemble the pre-Guideline indeterminate sentencing procedures where all
facts were fair game for the sentencer to consider.
V. THE BRIAR PATCH REMEDY
Like Brer Rabbit, federal prosecutors were merely sullied a bit after the
Booker decision. While it is true that the Court’s remedy primarily reflects a
choice for judicial sentencing over jury sentencing,44 it also expressed some
See, e.g., United States v. Sharpley, 399 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Nolan, 397
F.3d 665 (8th Cir. 2005). But see United States v. Huerta-Rodriguez, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1029
(D. Neb. 2005) (Battalion, J.) (“[T]his court finds that it will continue to require that facts that
enhance a sentence are properly pled in an indictment or information, and either admitted, or
submitted to a jury (or to the court if the right to a trial by jury is waived) for determination by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
42
Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2539 (2004) (suggesting that a rejection of Apprendi
could lead to the scenario of a conviction for murder even if the only fact found by the jury was
that the defendant made “an illegal lane change while fleeing the death scene”).
43
Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 765-66.
44
The Court is careful to cast this not as its own policy determination but rather as its
interpretation of the legislative preference as being more consistent with congressional intent.
41
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distrust of what has become prosecutorial sentencing45 in the federal
system. A good part of the remedial opinion was devoted to criticizing the
view that prosecutors were better capable of eliminating sentencing
disparity.46 A principle concern against engrafting the jury trial
requirement onto the Sentencing Reform Act was the concern that once
combined with prosecutorial selectivity in charging decisions, jury
sentencing would lead to unjustified disparity and disuniformity.
Notwithstanding this negative portrayal, prosecutors emerged from Booker
as well as could be expected. Sentencings will continue in most federal
courts as they have since the implementation of the Guidelines.
To the extent that the power of sentencing discretion has been restored
to the federal bench, judges appear to be the biggest winners in the postBooker world of indeterminate federal sentencing. Yet there is ample
evidence that judges may not take advantage of their new-found
discretion.47 Indeed, the very preliminary data suggests that so far courts
are following the guidelines in the overwhelming majority of cases. During
hearings held by the United States Sentencing Commission approximately
one month following the Booker decision, the chairman of the commission

The Court makes clear that the merits or demerits of judge-sentencing over jury-sentencing is a
policy question that it does not purport to address. Rather, the remedial majority explains its
rejection of the jury factfinding remedy on grounds of legislative intent. The Court mounts
several persuasive arguments as to why jury factfinding would be impractical and inconsistent
with Congress’ sentencing reform agenda. This may be so but the question remains as to
whether, in the eyes of Congress, judicial fact-finding would still be preferable.
45
Some have argued that the prosecutor’s power to charge bargain provides immense
power that essentially amounts to sentencing power. See GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S
TRIUMPH 205-230 (2003) (arguing that in certain guideline sentencing systems the true
sentencer becomes the prosecutor); David Boerner, Sentencing Guidelines and Prosecutorial
Discretion, 78 JUDICATURE 196 (1995); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power,
94 HARV. L. REV. 1521 (1981).
46
Justice Breyer’s remedial opinion noted: “guidelines sentencing empowers prosecutors,
even where the guidelines’ authors try to fight that tendency.” Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 782 (quoting
William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2548, 2559-2560 (2004)).
47
See Tom Schoenberg, For One Wary Judge, a Toe in the Water: Paul Friedman’s New World of
Penalties and Policy, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 14, 2005, at 1 (explaining that “locally, prosecutors say
they aren’t seeing much deviation from the guidelines. In the Eastern District of Virginia, U.S.
Attorney Paul McNulty says fewer than 10 of the sentences handed down since Booker/Fanfan
have been outside the guidelines”); see also Adam Liptak, Judges’ New Leeway in Choosing
Sentences May Result in Little Change, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2005, at A14 (asserting that the few
states having advisory sentencing guideline systems show “remarkable conformity” between
the guideline’s suggested sentences and the sentences actually imposed).
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noted that only nine percent of the 733 sentences imposed did not comply
with the previously mandatory guidelines.48
Consistent with this data, several judges have already announced that
they expect to continue with sentencing business as usual except in the
rarest of circumstances.49 One federal judge warned his colleagues on the
bench to use their “newly granted freedom” responsibly by not deviating
too much or too often from the guidelines.50 Another judge explained:
These principles change the Guidelines from being
mandatory to being advisory, but it is important to bear in
mind that Booker/Fanfan, and section 3553(a) do more than
render the Guidelines a body of casual advice, to be
consulted or overlooked at the whim of a sentencing judge.
Thus, it would be a mistake to think that, after
Booker/Fanfan, district judges may return to the sentencing
regime that existed before 1987 and exercise unfettered
discretion to select any sentence within the applicable
statutory maximum and minimum. On the contrary, the
Supreme Court expects sentencing judges faithfully to
discharge their statutory obligation to “consider” the
Guidelines and all of the other factors listed in section
3553(a).51
This jurist’s view is consistent with the Supreme Court’s admonishment
in Booker that judges were still required to consider the Guidelines, provide
clear reasons for their sentencing decisions, and continue to cooperate with
Sentencing Commission reporting requirements.52

48
See Implications of the Booker/Fanfan Decision for the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Hearing
Before the House Subcommittee On Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security, 109th Cong. 7 (2005)
(statement of Judge Ricardo H. Hinojosa, Chair, United States Sentencing Commission). These
figures should be contrasted to the pre-Booker sentences, in which, for example, judges in 2002
adhered to the guidelines in only sixty-five percent of cases. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2002
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS Fig. G (2002), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2002/fig-g.pdf [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK].
49
See United States v. Barkley, No. 04-CR-119-H, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2060, *13-14 (N.D.
Okla. Jan. 24, 2005); United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910 (D. Utah 2005). But see United
States v. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d 984, 987 (E.D. Wis. 2005) (criticizing Wilson and arguing that
“Booker is not an invitation to do business as usual”).
50
Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 66 (Cassell, J.) (imposing the same 188 month sentence in a postBooker robbery case that the pre-Booker guidelines would have mandated).
51
United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 113 (2d Cir. 2005) (Newman, J.).
52
United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 750-51 (2005).
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Second, even if judges ignored the Guidelines—which is unlikely for
the reasons stated above—sentences will not return to their pre-Guideline
equivalents. Twenty years of Guidelines have changed judges and have
forever altered their sense of what sentences are just and appropriate.53
Good judging is difficult, time-consuming work54 and the Guidelines offer a
systematic rational alternative that seems less arbitrary than the completely
unguided discretion of the preceding indeterminate sentencing era. An
indeterminate sentencing process may seem especially daunting to an entire
generation of federal judges that has never before considered a defendant’s
just punishment without the training wheels of a sentencing grid. The term
“fear of judging” coined by Kate Stith and José Cabranes—commonly used
to refer to the societal fear of judicial leniency and arbitrariness—may soon
come to mean the phobia experienced by judges themselves of now having
to make independent sentencing decisions.55
Finally, an advisory guideline system may not lead to changes in
sentencing results because district court judges may be wary of what
lawmakers might do if they perceive that new sentences are wildly
inconsistent with what the guidelines would have required.56 The threat of
an adverse congressional response limiting judicial discretion may be the
most significant prosecutorial check on sentencing.57

See Mauro, supra note 11, at 1 (noting that “[f]ederal judges—most of whom came to the
bench after mandatory guidelines took effect 20 years ago—will likely flex their new muscles
modestly.”).
54
As one judge explained:
Sentencing will be harder now than it was a few months ago. District
courts cannot just add up figures and pick a number within a narrow
range. Rather, they must consider all of the applicable factors, listen
carefully to defense and government counsel, and sentence the person
before them as an individual.
Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d at 987 (Adelman, J.).
55
See KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS (1998).
56
As one scholar notes “I rather suspect that the federal judiciary may come to regret what
has happened [in Booker] after Congress and the DOJ step in.” John Gibeaut, All Sides Wary of
Sentencing Ruling, 4 A.B.A. J. E REP. 2 (Jan. 14, 2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/
journal/ereport/j14sentence.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2005) (citing law professor and former
federal prosecutor Frank O. Bowman).
57
It is clear that the Department of Justice will also be actively monitoring judicial
sentencing decisions. See A View from Law Enforcement: Hearing Before the United States
Sentencing Commission, (Feb. 16, 2005) (testimony of Robert McCampbell, U.S. Attorney) at
http://www.ussc.gov/hearings/02_15_05/Transcript_16th.pdf (indicating that the
Department of Justice “will be collecting data” on judicial sentences). In January, Deputy
Attorney General James Comey sent a memo to the U.S. attorneys’ offices urging prosecutors
to promote the use of the federal guidelines “in all but the extraordinary cases,” while noting
which judges sentence outside the guideline. Schoenberg, supra note 47, at 1; see also Mauro,
53
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Not only is there reason to believe that sentences will remain largely
unchanged under the advisory guideline system, but the Court’s remedy
handed the prosecution a significant victory in its ruling regarding appeals.
The Court ruled that sentencing appeals in federal court would be governed
by a newly-announced “reasonableness standard” rather than a de novo
standard of review.58 What this vague new standard will mean in practice
has yet to be determined.59 Arguably, it provides a less meaningful
opportunity for appeal than the pre-Booker standard of de novo review. As
Justice Scalia writes, “[A] court of appeals might handle the new workload
by approving virtually any sentence within the statutory range that the
sentencing court imposes, so long as the district judge goes through the
appropriate formalities.”60 This is sure to impact the defense more
negatively since the vast majority of appeals are filed by defendants.61
This change in the appeal standard is a true victory for federal
prosecutors. Ninety-eight percent of appeals are filed by defendants.62 The
Department of Justice believes these appeals are a considerable strain on
Government resources. Indeed, the Department of Justice, which has long
been seeking a means of reducing the number of appeals filed by
defendants, instituted a broad strategy several years ago of recommending
that prosecutors insert appeal waivers in all applicable plea agreements.63
While its precise impact remains to be seen, this new appeal standard may

supra note 11, at 1 (quoting Assistant Attorney General Christopher Wray: “The Department
will continue to urge courts to apply the guidelines and to sentence offenders under the
guidelines in order to vindicate the core purposes of sentencing.”).
58
United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct., 738, 766 (2005).
59
Professor Steve Chanenson, Lecture at Association of Federal Defense Attorneys (Feb. 24,
2005).
60
Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 794. Justice Scalia adds:
At the other extreme, a court of appeals might handle the new workload
by approving virtually any sentence within the statutory range that the
sentencing court imposes, so long as the district judge goes through the
appropriate formalities, such as expressing his consideration of and
disagreement with the Guidelines sentence. What I anticipate will happen
is that ‘unreasonableness’ review will produce a discordant symphony of
different standards, varying from court to court and judge to judge. . . .
Id.
61
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 48, at tbl. 57, available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2002/
table57.pdf.
62
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 48, at tbls. 57-58. Of course, only ten percent of federal cases are
appealed. Id.
63
Catharine M. Goodwin, Summary: 1996 Committee on Criminal Law Memo on Waivers of
Appeal and Advisement of the Right to Appeal, 10 FED. SENTENCING REP. 212 (1998); John C.
Keeney, Justice Department Memo: Use of Sentencing Appeal Waivers to Reduce the Number of
Sentencing Appeals, 10 FED. SENTENCING REP. 209 (1998).
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go a long way in discouraging or nullifying many of the appeals that remain
in the wake of the appeal waiver policy.
VI. CONCLUSION
The briar patch analogy has its limitations. Unlike Brer Rabbit, the
Government appears to be neither celebrating nor claiming victory. But just
as Brer Rabbit did not hope for an encounter with a ball of tar, the
Government did not wish to have to defend the constitutionality of the
mandatory guideline system.64 But if the guidelines were to be declared
unconstitutional, its judicially-fashioned replacement could hardly be more
favorable to the Government. The threat of heavier evidentiary or
procedural burdens at sentencing is practically eliminated.65 Most judges
will probably continue to exercise (or not exercise) their new-found
discretion in a manner consistent with the Guidelines. Although some
defendants may receive lighter sentences than the Guidelines might require,
at least as many could receive higher sentences. And if criminal defendants
do not like their post-Booker sentences, they have less meaningful appeal
rights after Booker than they did before. For now it appears that this latest
battle in the war over sentencing has been won by the prosecution rather
than the defense. As with Brer Rabbit and Brer Fox, the saga continues.

64
In fact, no one would have even thought it possible ten years ago that the Supreme Court
would find the Guidelines unconstitutional. Certainly many have challenged the
constitutionality of the guidelines before Booker and Fanfan. See, e.g., Almendarez-Torres v.
United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998) (finding constitutional the combination of statutory and
guideline provisions that permit a judge to enhance a sentence based on prior convictions);
United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87 (1993) (rejecting claim that increase sentence for false
testimony violates Fifth Amendment confrontation rights); Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S.
453 (1991) (concluding that application of guidelines in calculating drug sentence did not
violate due process rights); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding the
constitutionality of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
65
Of course, nothing in Booker suggests a change in the Government’s Apprendi related
duties. Sentencing enhancement that increase the statutory maximum as described in Apprendi
must still be charged in the indictment and found by a jury or admitted at the plea.
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